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As the Shuttle/ISS EMU Program exceeds 35 years in duration and is still supporting the needs of the 
International Space Station (ISS), a critical benefit of such a long running program with thorough 
documentation of system and component failures is the ability to study and learn from those failures when 
considering the design of the next generation space suit.  Study of the subject failure history leads to changes 
in the Advanced EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) schematic, selected component technologies, as 
well as the planned manner of ground testing.  This paper reviews the Shuttle/ISS EMU failure history and 
discusses the implications to the AEMU PLSS. 
 
Nomenclature 
ABO: Aviator’s Breathing Oxygen 
ACC: Auto Cooling Control 
AEA: Assured EMU Availability 
AEMU: Advanced EMU 
AES: Advanced Exploration Systems 
AIT: Autogenous Ignition Temperature 
AISI: American Iron and Steel Institute 
ALCLR: AirLock Coolant Loop Remediation 
ALPS: AirLock Power Supply 
BLDC: BrushLess Direct Current 
BMS: Battery Management System 
BTU: British Thermal Unit 
BTU/hr: BTU/hr 
CCC: Contamination Control Cartridge 
CEI: Contract End Item 
CHX: Condensing Heat Exchanger 
CID: Current Interrupt Device 
CO2: carbon dioxide 
CON: controller 
COPV: Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessel 
COTS: Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CPV: Combination Purge Valve 
CWS: Caution and Warning System 
DCM: Display and Control Module 
DCU: Display and Control Unit 
DCS: DeCompression Sickness 
DI: DeIonized  
DP: Differential Pressure 
DRM: Design Reference Mission 
EC: Engineering Change 
ECWS: Enhanced Caution and Warning System 
                                                          
1 PLSS Lead, Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch, Crew 
and Thermal Systems Division, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston, Texas, 77058, Mail code EC5. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20150009506 2019-08-31T10:33:53+00:00Z
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EMI: Electro-Magnetic Interference 
EMU: Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ESA: European Space Agency 
ETDP: EVA Technology Development Program 
EV: ExtraVehicular 
EVA: ExtraVehicular Activity 
FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array 
F/P/S or FPS: Fan-Pump-Separator 
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FN: Fan 
FOD: Foreign Object Debris 
FSA: Feedwater Supply Assembly 
H2O: water 
HC: HydroCarbon 
HED: Hall Effect Device 
HUT: Hard Upper Torso 
HVAC: Heat Ventilation Air Conditioning 
HX: Heat eXchanger 
ICB: Increased Capacity Battery 
IFM: In Flight Maintenance 
ISS: International Space Station 
IV: Intra-Vehicular 
IVA: Intra-Vehicular Activity 
JSC: Johnson Space Center 
KOH: Potassium hydroxide 
krpm: thousand revolutions per minute 
LCVG: Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment 
LIB: Li-Ion Battery 
LLB: Long Life Battery 
LiOH: lithium hydroxide 
LLIL: Limited Life Items List 
LVDS: Low Voltage Differential Signaling 
MEOP: Maximum Expected Operating Pressure 
MLI: Multi-Layer Insulation 
MSPV: Multi-Position Suit Purge Valve 
NC: normally closed 
NDE: Non-Destructive Evaluation 
NESC: NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NPRV: Negative Pressure Relief Valve 
NVR: Non-Volatile Residue 
O2: oxygen 
OCA: Oxygen Compatibility Assessment 
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer 
ORU: On-orbit Replacement Unit or On-orbit Replaceable Unit 
PDA: Pre Delivery Acceptance 
PIA: Pre Installation Acceptance 
PMS: Power Mode Switch 
PLSS: Portable Life Support System 
POR: Primary Oxygen Regulator 
POV: Primary Oxygen Vessel 
pph: pounds per hour 
PPRV: Positive Pressure Relief Valve 
PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PRACA: Problem Reporting And Corrective Action 
PT: Pressure Transducer 
PTFE: Polytetrafluoroethylene 
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QD: quick disconnect 
RCA: Rapid Cycle Amine 
RCCA: Root Cause/Corrective Action 
RTD: Resistance Temperature Detector 
RV: Relief Valve 
SCU: Service and Cooling Umbilical 
SEM: Scanning Electron Microscope 
SEMU: Short EMU 
SOP: Secondary Oxygen Pack 
SOV: Secondary Oxygen Vessel 
STS: Space Transportation System 
SWME: Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator 
TCC: Trace Contaminant Control 
TCV: Thermal Control Valve 
TDL: Tunable Diode LASER 
TMG: Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment 
TMR: Triple Modular Redundancy 
UTRC: United Technologies Research Center 
VFR: Vent Flow Ring 
VOR: Variable Oxygen Regulator 
W: Watts 
WMS: Wavelength Modulation Spectroscopy 
WSTF: White Sands Test Facility 
 
I. Introduction 
In the 35+ years since the Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) began operations, it has been used to deploy 
and service satellites such as Intelsat VI and the Hubble Space Telescope, perform detailed test objectives to gain 
engineering data on suit performance, and many other tasks from the Shuttle Orbiter internal and then external airlocks 
as an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) platform. It was then migrated to become the International Space Station (ISS) 
US EVA spacesuit undergoing a number of upgrades but not significant redesign.  The underlying premise that NASA 
management employed in the management of the early EMU program was that of Root Cause Corrective Action 
(RCCA).  When failures occurred with the system, they were thoroughly investigated and if there was a hardware 
solution to mitigate that failure on future suit configurations and missions, then frequently within the balance of cost, 
schedule, and risk the hardware solution was implemented.  Over time, this approach matures the system as long as 
the redesigns or corrective actions are evolutionary in nature (i.e. addressing the outage while minimizing the addition 
of new “features” that cause future failure conditions).  These failures along with their corrective actions were 
documented in the NASA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) system such that they are available 
and searchable today making for a great lessons learned repository assuming the careful use of filtering and context. 
As the Shuttle EMU Program approached the end of its initial life of 15 years and 100 missions, a project within the 
EMU Program referred to as the Assured EMU Availability (AEA) project was initiated for the purpose of life 
extending the EMU by studying and ranking the components relative to risk and then implementing replacement or 
refurbishment plans for each based on the results of analysis, test, and “fleet leader” evaluations.  In each of the reports 
generated for each of the fleet leader components selected for evaluation, a wealth of lesson learned data is documented 
and available.  Each component selected for fleet leader evaluation was initially established by the principal 
investigator as the fleet leader using application specific criteria which could be operating time, operating life, cycle 
count, etc.  Once the fleet leader was identified and rotated out of operation back to the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) where the component underwent “as-received” testing against its component specification 
followed by progressively detailed inspections and tests looking at wear, corrosion, contamination, elastomeric set, 
etc.  After the thorough review of the entire sum of inspection and test data the fleet leader report would make 
recommendations related to replacement or refurbishment of the component; if the component was to be refurbished, 
the report would detail what parts were to be replaced, cleaned, etc to achieve an extension in the life of the part which 
was also variable based on the processes at play within the part and the supporting data.  The AEA fleet leader reports 
convey all of the data discussed above with the addition of the Engineering Change (EC) history, failure history, and 
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historical summary of configuration of the related components across the fleet.  Hence, the AEA fleet leader reports 
are a tremendous resource to study the manner in which a particular design progressed through its operational life as 
well as to investigate details of that design that could be evolved in the next component design.   
 
For the Advanced EMU (AEMU) development that began at the component level under the Exploration Technology 
Development Program (ETDP) in 2008 as a risk mitigation for future Constellation Program objectives, has continued 
into system level development under the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program.  As part of that development, 
establishing system and component level derived requirements based on a range of Design Reference Missions (DRM) 
and hosting vehicles was paralleled with pneumo-hydraulic schematic development which carefully examined the 
system designs used for the Apollo EMU as well as the Shuttle EMU and detailed in [1].  The common requirements 
related to human interfaces and similar to or evolved requirements related to vehicle interfaces and functional 
capabilities make quite relevant the study of the EMU operational history as it relates directly to the AEMU design 
space as well.  Hence, the systematic review of the successes and lessons learned as documented in the PRACA 
database, the reports from the AEA project, and the summaries within the EMU Requirements Evolution [2] have 
been key in areas to focus for reliability improvement.   
 
As a cautionary note regarding the blind use of the PRACA database, over the course of the EMU Program there have 
been many generations of personnel that have interpreted the rules for what is reportable and what is not and how to 
go about doing that.  The shear counting of failures can be misleading as there are some cases in which the same 
failure was duplicated across several separate reportable failure entries as each serial number was affected and in other 
cases all of the affected serial numbers may have been grouped under a single failure entry.  Distinctions like these 
require one to review the failure description for each entry and not necessarily rely on the total quantity as a single 
indicator. 
 
Before proceeding with a detailed discussion related to specific failure history of the Shuttle/ISS EMU and how it 
relates to choices or details within the design of the AEMU, a brief overview of context is needed to define each 
system. 
Shuttle/ISS EMU and AEMU PLSS 2.5 Overview 
The content contained herein is focused on the EMU failure history and how it can be and is being applied to the 
AEMU design as lessons learned go forward.  In order to contextualize the component references and functions, the 
relevant schematics (Figure 1, Figure 2) are included but further reading of the following references is suggested if 
more insight is required. At a high level, a schematics comparison between the EMU and AEMU yields a number of 
similarities with notable simplifications from the EMU to the AEMU due to the addition of key technologies such as 
the motor-settable mechanical regulator, the Rapid Cycle Amine (RCA) swing-bed, and the Spacesuit Water 
Membrane Evaporator (SWME).  There are obviously many more differences and new technologies included but this 
short list has provided the most significant impact on the schematic and design of the AEMU.  Many of these changes 
will be addressed in the relevant sections below.   
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 Figure 1 - ISS EMU Pneumo-hydraulic Schematic 
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 Figure 2 - AEMU PLSS 2.5 Pneumo-hydraulic Schematic 
Shuttle/ISS EMU Failure History with AEMU in mind 
As has been discussed previously, the AEMU development has been progressing and influenced by corporate 
knowledge with discrete investigations of selected components to achieve a base design iteration (PLSS 2.5) 
progressing in maturity towards the final flight design.  This review of the Shuttle/ISS EMU failure history will then 
be grouped based on existing choices such that they are: components with similar design, components removed 
between ISS EMU and AEMU, and components that have been redesigned. The overall approach that has governed 
those choices has been to “fix what is broken” but carry on mature designs that work well.  Those will be discussed 
in detail in the following paragraphs. In order to structure the review, the components have been listed by their ISS 
EMU Program Contract End Item (CEI) numbers with comparison to the AEMU PLSS 2.5 Item Designations.  For 
the purposes of nomenclature throughout this document, EMU will be used to refer to the Shuttle/ISS EMU and 
AEMU will be used to refer to the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Advanced EMU. 
A. Components with similar design between ISS EMU and AEMU 
In reality, given improvements in technology over the past few decades fewer than 20% of the components were 
carried through using the same technology or design.   
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Shuttle/ISS 
EMU CEI Description 
AEMU 
Item Description 
111 Primary Oxygen Tank PV-111 Primary Oxygen Vessel 
123A Fan/Pump/Separator - Fan FN-323 FN-324 Ventilation Loop Fan 
126 Filter and orifice (for IRCO2 sensor) OR-324 OR-301 Orifice for multi-gas sensors 
147 Negative Pressure Relief Valve (NPRV) RV-347 Negative Pressure Relief Valve (NPRV) 
161 PLSS/SOP TMG Z-007 PLSS TMG 
213 Secondary Oxygen Pressure Control Module PRV-213 Secondary Oxygen Regulator 
215 Secondary Oxygen Bottle Pressure PT-215 Secondary Oxygen Vessel Pressure 
Table 1 - Components with Similar Design 
Primary Oxygen Tank (Item 111) 
For the AEMU, this design is shared between both the Primary Oxygen Vessel (POV) and also the Secondary Oxygen 
Vessel (SOV) as they are identical designs for commonality and cost reduction.  This was possible due to the selection 
of a single operating pressure for the tankage of 3000 psi rather than the divergent pressure schedules used in the ISS 
EMU which were 900 psi in the primary and 6000 psi in the secondary.  The Item 111 on the ISS EMU Program is a 
cryo-formed AISI 301 tank which was actually a lesson learned early in the Shuttle EMU Program.  The cryo-formed 
tankage was originally used as the primary tankage in the Apollo EMU and the Shuttle EMU was looking to use newer 
technologies that could offer a lower cost and a small mass savings so they performed a trade and selected an aluminum 
lined fiberglass overwrap tank design.  Significant issues were observed in production along with the issues that plague 
the composite tank designs such as designing a critical pressure vessel as “leak before burst”, being able to properly 
model the vessel, being able to properly inspect the vessel given its composite nature to ensure that the load bearing 
filament, or the accumulation of Discrepancy Reports (DR) from rigorous and repeated quality inspections during 
flight processing due to minor imperfections in the outer wrap.  The early Shuttle EMU tankage was demonstrated as 
“leak before burst” via test but the supplier had difficulty producing them reliably so the program reverted to the 
Apollo EMU tankage design which had worked well previously, made a few process updates to enhance the yield and 
lower the scrap rate, then implemented the design.  As of 2004, the tankage had been life extended to 32 years by the 
AEA project given inspections [3].  A review of the PRACA failure history covering the Item 111 yielded no hardware 
failures attributed to the tankage.   
 
At the beginning of the ETDP, an initial market survey and trade study was performed which evaluated available 
approaches for the tankage.  For the AEMU trade study, the cost of custom tankage runs using COPV or cryo-formed 
301 were similar.  Likewise, there was minimal potential mass savings (~ 1.6 lbm/tank) as well, leading to the 
consideration of reliability and safety (leak before burst design) as the driving factor.  That consideration favored the 
use of the cryo-formed AISI 301, a monolithic material that can be analyzed, designed as leak-before-burst, and 
directly inspected.  These factors coupled with the extended successful usage on both the Apollo and Shuttle/ISS EMU 
Programs led to the use of the same approach for the AEMU.  
 
Centrifugal Fan (Item 123A) 
For the EMU, the Item 123 Fan/Pump/Separator is one of the most complex devices within the PLSS as it combines 
a centrifugal fan, a pitot separator, and magnetically coupled centrifugal water pump all on a single shaft connected 
to a BLDC motor with on-board controller.  As noted in [2], the choice was made to combine all of these functions 
together onto a single motor in order to save 10W of power over the Apollo PLSS which had a separate fan and pump.  
A review of the PRACA failure history reveals a total 96 failures attributed to the F/P/S as a component over the life 
of the program to date including three significant in flight failures (Figure 3), each attributed to the fan, pump, and 
water separator, respectively.  The first in-flight failure occurred early in the Shuttle/EMU Program on STS-5 due to 
corrosion of one of the Hall Effect Devices (HED) exposed to the moist ventilation loop [4].  The fan was redesigned 
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in two steps yielding a “canned motor” which physically isolated the stator from the armature (and ventilation loop) 
using a metal can with redundant elastomeric seals.  The bearings remained in the ventilation loop with added features 
(drain holes, slinger, change to Mobil 28 bearing grease, etc) to improve tolerance of condensate from the ventilation 
loop.  The design then functioned well in operation with the balance of the failure reports over the next ~18 years 
mostly limited to non-functional or test configuration issues.  The second major flight failure occurred with the loss 
of the water pump function during ISS Increment 7 on two different suits at the same time, SEMU 3005 and SEMU 
3013.  The coupled, tightly tolerance centrifugal water pump that had worked well in Shuttle-based EVAs over the 
previous two decades was not performing well a few years into the mission in the ISS Airlock as the thermal loop 
contaminants increased.   In the end, the two failed units suffered from rotor growth from internal corrosion of the 
permanent magnet potting within the rotor; the water quality in the thermal loop was addressed by increased on-orbit 
maintenance both scrubbing the loop via resin beds and increased biocide dosing with Iodine using the Airlock Coolant 
Loop Remediation (ALCLR) system.  A sharp, well experienced mentor and former EMU Program Manager used to 
say that “every design change to fix one problem causes two more…” [5].  The statement seemed a bit cynical but in 
this case it could be seen as prophetic.  As the use of ALCLR followed on during the ISS Program as a remediation 
to the initial failure of the pump, the third major in flight failure occurred with the “water intrusion” failure of the 
integrated pitot style water separator in SEMU 3011 during ISS EVA 23 [6].  The failure of the pitot separator was 
attributed to the accumulation of silica from contaminated ALCLR beds in the small holes around the outer part of the 
drum on the separator preventing it from feeding condensate to the pitot and forcing it back to the feedwater bladders.  
This produced overflow from a portion of the ~11pph slurry fed from the gas trap which drifted into the fan volute as 
well as excessive sublimator carryover (condensed ventilation loop moisture not picked up by the sublimator slurper 
which migrates beyond the sublimator in the ventilation loop).  The two sources contributed to an excess of free water 
in the ventilation loop which was then migrated downstream into the helmet area where an estimated 1 to 1.5 liters 
accumulated by the end of the EVA termination.  The most recent failure occurred when a FPS would not spin up 
during an ALCLR maintenance activity.  The investigation is on-going but appears to be attributable to fan motor 
bearing corrosion with the cause theorized to be increased FPS on/off cycles driven by ALCLR usage in which the 
pitot separator drum is filling on startup and dumping ~10cc water on shutdown into the fan volute allowing the free 
water to work its way back to the fan bearings.      
 
 
 Figure 3 - EMU Item 123 F/P/S Failure History 
When evaluating the operational and failure history of the FPS in consideration with the design implementation of 
similar functions in the AEMU, the following takeaways come to mind: 
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1. After its initial design, the canned motor concept and design has an excellent usage history on both ground 
and on-orbit over a period of 30 years.  The chief contributor to failures both before the motor canning and 
recently on ISS, has been the presence of free water in the ventilation loop.  The use of an amine swing-bed 
for CO2 and H2O removal from the ventilation loop in the AEMU precludes the need for a condensing heat 
exchanger and allows the ventilation loop to operate with significantly more thermal excursion margin with 
respect to the dew point (similar to the concept of superheat in a vapor compression cycle HVAC system); 
hence, no real risk of making free water in the AEMU ventilation loop with the relative humidity typically 
running <25% (dew points typically near 20-30F) and a sensible heat exchanger operating on the thermal 
loop inputs at 50F.  Use of the canned motor design, but with a ceramic can is advantageous at this point, not 
because of the need for free water/humidity tolerance but because of the oxygen compatibility or isolation of 
wetted oxygen from the higher current carrying drive circuits in the motor stator [7].   
2. The use of a tightly tolerance or shaft coupled centrifugal water pump should be excluded from consideration.  
This is the case and will be discussed at length throughout this paper.  The desire to decouple the fluid loops, 
tolerate water contamination, save power, lower pump speed, enable self-priming, tolerate entrained gas, 
lower the cavitation pressure point, and add redundancy all drive the selections towards a positive 
displacement pump like the gerotor style presently used in the AEMU. 
3. The use of a condensing heat exchanger and pitot water separator is not necessary as discussed earlier but 
also not advisable for additional reasons such as the need to tolerate contaminated thermal loop fluid, the 
very cause for one of the on-orbit failures of the EMU FPS.   
4. For long term missions such as ISS and exploration missions yet to be defined, the water quality will more 
than likely be more challenging than DI water so future systems such as the AEMU will be designed and 
tested with contaminants realized from the ISS EMU Program and from theorized contaminants based on 
materials of construction.  This also assumes the switching of the biocide selection from Iodine which the 
EMU had for compatibility reasons with the Shuttle to silver which ISS, the Russian Orlan, and all future 
ECLSS systems have been using or are planning.  A tightly toleranced, low torque pump would not be 
expected to fare well with silver plating, a side effect of using silver as a biocide albeit that the spacesuit/PLSS 
have a pretty high surface area to volume ratio with the majority of it as non-metallics such as Ethylene-
Vinyl Acetate (EVA) tubing used in the Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment (LCVG).    
5. A few failures were carried at the system level (EMU, SEMU, PLSS) but were considered to be an interaction 
between the FPS motor/controller, the Air-lock Power Supply (ALPS), and radio such that communications 
were interrupted when certain serial numbers were combined.  This was managed logistically and screened 
directly during V1103.02, the Orbiter to EMU preflight verification performed about 10 days before every 
Shuttle launch.  Improved motor control and noise isolation on the power lines will be an objective for the 
AEMU fan implementation and the subject of many integrated electrical tests as the AEMU design matures 
as a reference.   
 
CO2 Control Orifice (Item 126) 
The EMU Item 126, a simple .022in dia orifice that throttles the flow into the Item 122 IRCO2 sensor has no failures 
attributed to it.  An orifice design is a simple one that is easily modeled and verified and one that is being applied in a 
similar manner to control the flow through the multi-gas sensors GS-322/GS-300 on the AEMU. 
 
Negative Pressure Relief Valve (Item 147) 
The NPRV is a valve that protects for the rare condition in which the airlock is rapidly repressed from vacuum to 
ambient pressure at a rate of 1 psi/sec.  It has been a relatively reliable design over the duration of the Shuttle/ISS 
EMU Programs with four failures identified in a PRACA review (Figure 4), only two of which in the last 35 years 
were believed to be contamination.   
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 Figure 4 - Item 147 PRACA History Plot 
The presence of potential contamination with this valve exposure to ambient on the exterior and, on the interior to a 
ventilation loop with a crewmember wearing textiles and multiphase fluids with corrosion products, is not that 
surprising as there will always be a balance between protecting the valve with filters that impede its desired function.  
The filtration requirements will be reassessed with respect to exploration usage going forward.  Aside from a potential 
increase in flow capability (~60 pph) to cover suit free volumes of 3ft3 and a change in the mounting associated with 
direct mounting on the Hard Upper Torso (HUT), the valve design will be similar. The key difference between the 
EMU and AEMU is in the first 2 failures, both due to inadvertent contact with the exterior screen (Figure 5) which 
then deformed inward causing the valve to stroke open.  For EMU, this valve is located within the PLSS and protected 
by a fiberglass “impact shield” underneath the PLSS TMG; the two failures occurred during processing where the 
impact shield and TMG were not present leading to the implementation of a protective cover that is removed at the 
time of final assembly of the impact shield and TMG onto the PLSS.  For the AEMU, whether this valve is placed on 
the exterior of the HUT or within the PLSS and subject to In Flight Maintenance (IFM), the valve needs to incorporate 
some level of impact protection that serves the same function as the tool that was developed on the EMU Program. 
  Figure 5 - EMU Item 147 NPRV Photo/Diagram 
PLSS Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment (Item 161) 
Due to the simplicity and the fact that the materials of construction remain state of the art, the basic TMG design will 
be similar for the AEMU.  Ortho-fabric which is well documented and possesses advantageous emissivity/absorptivity 
will be used for the external layer.  The chief differences will likely be the number of Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) 
layers based on the required thermal performance on static surfaces such as the PLSS outer shell (vs surfaces on the 
suit where mobility is inhibited reducing the MLI to a minimum) and careful selection and implementation of closure 
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devices such as zippers, Velcro, snaps, etc.  As is indicated in Figure 6, a review of the PRACA system reveals a total 
of 6 failures written against the PLSS TMG over the life of the EMU Program, all occurring with the original Shuttle 
laced-closure style TMG and none with the ORU TMG introduced in 1998.  Five of the six failures were related to 
the breakage of zipper closures which appear to have been mitigated in the design of the ORU TMG potentially due 
to both improvements in the zipper design but also perhaps the fact that the ORU TMG uses Velcro and snap closures 
rather than lacing cord making for a looser fit and reduced side load on the zippers used for the Metox/Battery 
consumables access flap. 
 
 Figure 6 - Item 161 PLSS TMG Failure History 
Secondary Oxygen Regulator (Item 213) 
The SOP regulator was the cause of the worst suit-related failure in history.  In 1980, in B7 at JSC, PLSS S/N 1002 
was undergoing a checkout and its first oxygen wetting in the lab.  When the technician proceeded to take the O2 
actuator to EVA and engage the SOP regulator, an oxygen fire occurred injuring the technician and destroying the 
PLSS, including SOP (Figure 7).  There are multiple potential causes for this event, among them are adiabatic 
compression heating of the Silastic 675 o-seals [8], particle impact ignition of a dead-end aluminum passage [9], 
adiabatic compression heating of kindling chain contaminants in the dead end passage or compression heating or 
rupture of a thin aluminum section in the dead-ended passage.  Many of the procedures and processes and supporting 
data that is taken as a standard today came from the study and corrective action from this event.  The SOP regulator 
was completely redesigned:  
 dead-end passages were removed 
 the body was changed from aluminum to monel (non-flammable under these operating pressures) 
 the fast acting upstream shut-off valve was removed 
o shut-off accomplished via 2nd stage regulator lock-up 
 many other more subtle changes were made 
Several NASA processes were changed including the requirement to perform the initial oxygen wetting (minimum of 
10 impacts of pure O2) at an appropriate facility like the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF).   
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 Figure 7 - SOP Fire Photos (1980) 
After the redesign, the regulator design was stable until the late 1980’s when failures were experienced with the 1st 
stage diaphragm due to corrosion from residual soldering flux.  The process was corrected to address cleaning of the 
diaphragm and the problem did not recur.  As is annotated in Figure 8, another significant event occurred in the year 
2000, in which the entire EMU fleet was found to be contaminated with hydrocarbon Non-Volatile Residue (NVR).  
Nearly all Oxygen Compatibility Assessments (OCA) generated by WSTF, consider a “clean” system with an “A” 
rating per JPR5322.1 (< 1 mg/ft2) or equivalent and a maximum allowable NVR level of < 2 mg/ft2.  This unlikely 
systematic contamination event yielded > 100 mg/ft2 of C10-C34 NVR near/on the seat of the regulator [10].  Three 
different improbable mechanisms were found to have contributed to contamination of the entire fleet of SOP regulators 
1. Direct contamination of the interfacing test rigs with Sebacate hydrocarbon oil via improperly 
connected/faulty dead weight testers which was then transported to the regulator 
a. Found in 4 of 12 regulators sampled [11] 
2. Secondary contamination of the interfacing test rigs from Fomblin oil leaking through failed diaphragms on 
compressors and subsequent transport of background hydrocarbon contamination to the regulator 
3. Direct contamination of the regulator from trace quantities of hydrocarbons permitted in Aviator’s Breathing 
Oxygen (ABO) or nitrogen manifested due to Joule-Thompson cooling of the regulator during high flow 
acceptance testing during the Pre Delivery Acceptance (PDA) testing 
The regulator fleet was cleaned and refurbished and cryogenic coldtraps were developed and placed in front of the 
regulators during testing with gas supplies at the OEM and the field laboratories.  A Limited Life Items List (LLIL) 
requirement was levied on the SOP regulator such that it had to be refurbished after 2.5 mg/ft2 HC NVR was 
accumulated based on a relation of worst case allowable contaminants of ABO and an established empirical efficiency 
of the coldtraps protecting the regulators during test. 
Since the SOP began flying to ISS, it has been tracked as a consumable given that it cannot be recharged on-orbit; the 
lock-up leakage performance that is nominally achieved by the second stage regulator seat design (sapphire ball/vespel 
seat) enables the charging and flying of SOP’s for 2+ years until they drop below no-go threshold ~5400 psia.    
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 Figure 8 - Item 213 SOP Regulator Failure History 
Key takeaways from this operational history: 
1. The regulator design has been reliable since its redesign in the early 1980’s. 
2. The assumption that a high pressure oxygen system will remain clean indefinitely with procedural controls 
is suspect.  Not one, not two, but three different mechanisms were found as contributors to the contamination 
of the system. 
3. The second stage regulator seat has incredible lock-up leakage performance 
These lessons learned from the ISS EMU have been applied to the Variable Oxygen Regulator (VOR) design and 
development under ETDP and now AES.  For the VOR, which is implemented in both the Primary Oxygen Regulator 
(POR) and Secondary Oxygen Regulator (SOR) for commonality, the design leverages much of the second stage 
design but simplifies the first stage regulator to a piston sense design to remove the diaphragm that was the subject of 
a failure in late 1989.  With the lowered operating pressure (3000 psi nominal, 3750 MEOP), the Nickel 200 mesh 
filters are considered non-flammable and serve to protect the seats from particle impact as well as to protect from 
combustion propagation.  Several of the elastomeric seals have been removed and replaced by copper crush seals. 
Other seals have been protected metal annuluses with high L/D to reduce adiabatic compression heating of the seals.  
The VOR 2.0 regulator was tested at WSTF in 2013 initially with 60 dry impacts of ABO at 3750 psia and elevated 
temperature and then 10 impacts (2 sets of 5 with added HC each time) with >100 mg/ft2 of dodecane at elevated 
temperatures [12].  The regulator operated nominally through-out the test and appeared clean to the naked eye during 
post-test teardown.  After closure inspection with magnification (Figure 9) and later SEM, evidence was present that 
the dodecane had combusted within the interstage but the design precluded the propagation. 
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 Figure 9 - Sapphire Ball from 1st Stage Regulator 
Secondary Oxygen Vessel Pressure (Item 215) 
The EMU Item 215 is unique from many of the other pressure transducers in the EMU as it was redesigned in 2000 
and does not rely on a bourdon tube-pot/wiper assembly, rather it utilizes a diaphragm/strain gauge based design more 
common to most modern pressure transducers.   
  
The PRACA history for this component (Figure 10) indicates that 16 failures have been attributed to this component 
over the course of the EMU Program with one in flight failure which was eventually attributed to EMI as the sensor 
became known as the “EMI sensor” providing occasional false high readings when the radios were turned on in the 
airlock.  After initial failures associated with solving EMI shielding/termination on the new design followed by some 
supplier manufacturing process issues, the sensor has been free of failures in the past 9 years. 
 
 Figure 10 - EMU Item 215 SOP Pressure Transducer Failure History 
The bulk of the sensors included in the AEMU utilize the strain gauge/diaphragm approach with recent improvements 
in isolation within the sensor electronics.  Extensive testing will be performed to determine effectiveness of the 
evolved design. 
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B. Components removed from ISS EMU to AEMU 
Throughout the AEMU development, schematic simplification has been a goal as permitted by available technologies 
that have been developed in the time since the design of the EMU: 
 Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator (SWME)  
 Rapid Cycle Amine (RCA) swing bed 
 High Efficiency BLDC motor with ceramic canned motor 
 Gerotor style positive displacement pumps 
 
AEMU Thermal loop simplifications 
The combination of the SWME input pressure tolerance and implementation of a separated positive displacement 
thermal loop pump (Gerotor) led to the removal of the following components from the EMU schematic: 
 Item 113E – Primary Pressure Control Module, Feedwater Pressure Regulator 
The feedwater pressure regulator is a component within the Item 113, Primary Pressure Control Module 
which is responsible for regulating the inlet pressure from the primary oxygen tanks at ~900 psia to a 
nominal pressure of 14.6-15.7 psid [13] which is fed to the backside of the feedwater bladders in the 
watertank structure.  For the AEMU, this regulator was removed as a result of at the breakout of 
Fan/Pump/Separator (F/P/S) into two discrete components, a centrifugal fan and gerotor style positive 
displacement pump.  The EMU F/P/S runs at a nominal 19.7krpm when in speed control with a 
centrifugal fan, pitot style water separator, and centrifugal pump all combined onto a single BLDC 
motor.  For the pump, testing early in the EMU Program demonstrated a need for a supply pressure 
above suit pressure and ~15 psia under EVA conditions was selected as the range. For the AEMU, with 
the use of the gerotor style pump which operates without cavitation down to pressures as low as 2.7 psia, 
the input pressure is being driven by the suit ventilation loop pressure between 3.5 – 8.4 psia under EVA 
conditions.   Hence, the function is satisfied by either the PRV-113 or PRV-213 allowing for a simpler 
and yet redundant thermal loop pressure source capable of allowing nominal thermal loop operation even 
when on secondary oxygen supply; something that the EMU cannot accommodate.  This has the effect 
of converting a several 1R failure modes to 2R failure modes.  A review of the PRACA system indicates 
that 18 failures of the 59 attributed to the Item 113. 
 Item 120 – Dual Mode Relief Valve 
With deletion of the Item 113E, a separate dual mode relief valve and orifice was no longer needed as 
the relief protection for the thermal loop gas side pressure is the same as the ventilation loop, RV-346 
PPRV. The Item 120A orifice which was used to keep the Item 113E from going into lock-up and 
overshooting the pressure set-point given the exceedingly low demand needed to feed the bladder volume 
change was again simplified when combined with the ventilation loop as the demand applied to the PRV-
113/PRV-213 regulators consisting of suit leakage makeup and metabolic consumption is adequate to 
preclude the need for a separate bleed or demand.  A review of the PRACA system indicates that 42 
failures have been attributed to the Item 120 Dual Mode Relief Valve.   
 Item 128 – Pump Inlet Check Valve (a pump inlet filter similar but more course than the Item 127 still exists 
to protect the gerotor style pump) 
The use of the gerotor style positive displacement pump removed the need for the Item 128 check valve 
which was used to assist with priming the centrifugal pump in the Item 123, F/P/S.  A review of the 
PRACA system indicates that 5 failures have been attributed to the Item 128 Pump Inlet Check Valve 
all related to leakage. 
 Item 132A - Feedwater supply pressure sensor, gas side 
With removal of the separate gas supply via the Item 113E, the pressure transducers monitoring the suit 
ventilation loop pressure perform the equivalent function.  In the case of the AEMU, DP-114 and DP-
214 perform this function with added redundancy over the EMU and logic included as part of the CWS 
to enable exclusion of a faulty sensor without the need of a third voting sensor as would be used for 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) approaches. A review of the PRACA system indicates that 17 
failures have been attributed to the Item 132. 
 Item 135 – Feedwater Relief Valve 
Movement of the feedwater bladders from the three Fluorel bladders housed within a rigid aluminum 
watertank structure, to bladders with more compliant integrated fabric restraints retained in the hatch of 
the rear entry Hard Upper Torso (HUT) removed the need for the Item 135 which was present to prevent 
a hard-charged bladder from over-pressuring the rigid feedwater tank structure due to thermal expansion 
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of the trapped fluid.  A review of the PRACA system indicates that 16 failures have been attributed to 
the Item 135. 
 Item 136 - Feedwater pressure regulator 
The Item 136 serves to reduce the feedwater pressure sourced from Item 113E at ~15 psid to 2.05-4.15 
psid [13] such that the Item 140 sublimator porous plate does not experience “break-through” resulting 
in the dumping of feedwater into space.  The SWME input water pressure range has been tested in 
development up to 21 psid during AEMU PLSS 1.0 Bread-board testing [14] with fiber weeping near 40 
psid making it acceptable to pressurize the thermal loop via the ventilation loop pressure 3.5 – 8.4 psid.  
The final pressure schedule for the SWME is presently under revision based on the needed support 
operations such as vacuum water recharge vs the available vehicle interfaces.  A review of the PRACA 
system indicates that 30 failures have been attributed to the Item 136. 
 Item 137 – Feedwater Shut-off Valve 
The Item 137 serves to isolate the feedwater source from the sublimator when not at vacuum conditions 
below the triple point of water which would facilitate the formation of the ice layer within the porous 
plate.  If the valve were not present or were thrown open prior without vacuum available, the feedwater 
fills in the small gap under the porous plate and flows out through the porous plate quickly extinguishing 
the feedwater supply.  If the system is then taken to vacuum after this situation has occurred the 
expansion of the feedwater in the gap under the porous plate results in permanent warping of the plate 
and an underperforming sublimator.  A review of the PRACA system indicates that 17 failures have been 
attributed to the Item 137. 
 Item 142 – Feedwater Relief Valve 
The Item 142 is a relief valve that is positioned between the reserve feedwater bladder and the two main 
feedwater bladders which cracks at 4-5 psid [13] enabling the transition from primary feedwater supply 
to reserve supply via a difference between the Item 132A and Item 132B feedwater pressure transducers.  
The ECWS uses a limit of 2.1 psid as the empirically resolved trigger to determine when the system is 
using reserve water.  For the AEMU, there is no separate primary and reserve bladder, rather just a single 
primary bladder that has variable compliance such that the reduction in the pump inlet pressure as read 
by PT-432 can be used to determine when 1-1.5 lbm of feedwater remains in the bladder.  This particular 
method is the alternate method to determine critical water levels in the event of an external leak given 
that the primary method for determination of water quantity remaining is offered by the direct calculation 
of heat rejection from the SWME which was found to have a 95-99% utilization rate in AEMU PLSS 
1.0 testing [14].  A review of the PRACA system indicates that 4 failures have been attributed to the 
Item 142.   
 Item 143 – Feedwater Check Valve 
The Item 143 is a check valve that enables the feedwater recharge filling the two main water bladders to 
also fill the reserve bladder on the same umbilical recharge line.  The valve has a maximum cracking 
pressure of 1.0 psid [13].  The removal of a separate reserve bladder resulted in the removal of the Item 
142 as well as the Item 143.  A review of the PRACA system indicates that 1 failure has been attributed 
to the Item 143.   
 
AEMU Ventilation Loop Simplifications 
The combination of the RCA which removes CO2 and H2O from the ventilation loop along with the SWME which 
removes gas from the thermal loop allowed the removal of the condensate loop and the condensing heat exchanger 
function that the EMU Item 140 Sublimator performed.  The water separator is implemented via a small pitot style 
probe that sits fixed on the F/P/S and extends into a rotating drum that is coupled to the BLDC motor shaft spinning 
at ~19.7krpm.  The spinning drum is fed a slurry of gas bubbles and water through small port holes extending to the 
outer part of the drum.  The water is slung using centrifugal force to the outside of the drum whereas the gas is freed 
and drifts toward the center which is open to the fan intake. The water slurry is sourced from either the Item 140 
Sublimator slurpers picking up condensate from the ventilation loop or from the gas trap picking up a bubble slurry 
in the thermal loop.  Since the RCA removes CO2 and H2O simultaneously from the ventilation loop, the slurper 
function is not required.  Also, since the SWME removes gas bubbles from the thermal loop directly by venting them 
across the membrane walls to vacuum, the gas trap which feeds the majority of the slurry (~ 11pph) to the separator 
is not required either and the separator itself is not required.  The deletion of the condensate loop results in a decoupling 
of the thermal and ventilation loops significantly reducing the opportunity for failure modes that result in free water 
in the ventilation loop, a direct hazard for the crew and a significant contributor to subsequent component failures due 
to the affects from free water (corrosion of fan bearings, latch-up of the CO2 sensor, corrosion of ventilation loop flow 
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passages, etc).   The removal of the condensate loop and water separator led specifically to the removal of the following 
components: 
 Item 123B – Fan/Pump/Separator – Water Separator 
As noted previously, the function is satisfied by a combination of the RCA and SWME. A review of the 
PRACA database indicates that at least 8 of the 96 F/P/S failures were attributed to the Item 123B pitot 
separator including the prominent in-flight failure on ISS EVA 23 already discussed earlier but also one 
just prior to STS-98 related to the potential loss of weld plugs from the pitot posing an ignition risk were 
they to drift back into the aluminum fan impeller running at 19.7krpm.  This particular failure was not 
just a functional loss for removing condensate from the ventilation loop and the inability to degas the 
thermal loop, it also posed a catastrophic oxygen fire hazard to the crew.   
 Item 141 – Gas Trap 
The gas trap is a ~20 micron absolute pleated filter screen configured in a cylindrical shape with an 
orifice tube positioned at the internal center axis to scavenge gas bubbles trapped in the screen as the 
thermal loop flow passes through [2].  This is the finest filter in the loop under nominal operating 
conditions and is responsible for protecting the tight tolerances between the pump impeller and housing.  
A review of the PRACA database indicates that 18 failures have been attributed to the gas trap over the 
course of the EMU Program, the majority of which have been caused by contamination of the filter mesh.  
This is one of the reasons that the AEMU design includes the thermal loop filter, F-448 that includes 
considerably more surface area and is located within the rear entry hatch for easy access to allow 
replacement as a maintenance item. 
 Item 140 – Sublimator (CHX slurper) 
The sublimator slurper which performs the condensing heat exchanger function is composed of a 
ventilation loop passage coated in a hydrophilic coating thermally tied to the core with small holes on 
the edges connected to the inlet of the Item 123B water separator.  A review of the PRACA database 
indicates that 3 failures of the 35 generated against the Item 140 sublimator, have been attributed to the 
slurper hydrophilic coating.  That last failure of the three occurred more than 26 years ago indicating 
that the corrective actions for the contamination thought to have caused the noted failures were 
successful.   
 Item 125 - Pitot Actuated Valve 
This valve ensures that flow from the gas trap to the water separator is isolated if the water separator 
cannot generate needed head-rise.  The valve allows a manual over-ride actuation in order to prime the 
water separator should it not self-prime from residual water in the drum.  Removal of the water separator 
removes the need for this valve.  A review of the PRACA database indicates that 5 failures total have 
been attributed to the Item 125 over the life of the program with 4 of them related to contamination and 
subsequent leakage.   
 Item 134 – Condensate Water Relief Valve 
This check valve prevents back-flow of water from the feedwater tanks/thermal loop if the water 
separator is not spinning or generating pressure head.  Removal of the water separator removes the need 
for this valve.  Review of the PRACA database indicates that 17 failures have been attributed to the Item 
134 over the course of the program.   
 Item 171/172 – Coolant Loop Isolation Valve 
This solenoid valve is actuated via the Fan switch and is intended to preclude the pressurization of the 
thermal loop prior to operation of the F/P/S, specifically the separator.  Removal of the separator and 
associated condensate loop removes the need for this valve.  Review of the PRACA database indicates 
that there have been 13 failures attributed to the Item 171/172 over the course of the program. 
 
Oxygen System Simplification 
For the packaging method utilized by the ISS EMU, the main structural parts consist of the aluminum watertank 
structure topped by a stainless steel valve module and a shearplate assembly that attaches the primary oxygen tanks 
and regulator to the bottom side of the watertank structure. For the AEMU, the selection of a common operating 
pressure of 3000 psia between both the primary and secondary oxygen assemblies coupled with the implementation 
of a two stage motor settable mechanical regulator design allows for commonality between the primary and secondary 
oxygen supplies (Figure 13).  The pressure allows for recharge of both supplies via the SCU removing the need for an 
ORU-able Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP) package necessitated by the fact that the EMU SOP pressure is ~6000 psi 
and not rechargeable on-orbit. The conversion to a motor-settable mechanical regulator which utilizes a stepper 
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actuator to compress the main load-spring a total stroke of ~.5in in 8000 steps eliminates the need for the sliding 
mechanical cable and micro-switches that drive a complex, tightly toleranced sliding cam in order to change the set-
point on the Item 113 and engage the Item 213, SOP regulator (Figure 12).  Hence, the following EMU items were 
removed along with the failure modes associated with them: 
 Item 115 – Shearplate Assembly 
The reference to the Item 115 here is not to include the removal of tankage (Item 111) as that is addressed 
separately, but moreover to address the removal of the structural and actuator linkage components of the 
shearplate assembly.  Review of the PRACA database indicates that 31 failures have been attributed to 
the Item 115, Shearplate assembly with 14 of those failures attributed to the actuator mechanism itself 
with most of those due to binding or exceeding the actuation force allocation.  The removal of the slide 
actuator also removes the micro switches and interface that is brought all the way around to the front of 
the DCM.  This slide actuator interface is where the crew interfaces with gloved hands to the regulator 
assemblies for the purpose of choosing the regulator set-point configurations.  This assembly has been 
subject to contamination as a cause for the binding but has also suffered from binding due to bending of 
the delicate slide shown in the anterior portion of Figure 11.  For the AEMU, removal of this interface 
and replacement with a less sensitive electrical switch interface to a controlled stepper motor driver may 
prove to be an adequate answer to these observed failures.   
 Figure 11 - EMU Shearplate Photo 
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 Figure 12 - EMU Shearplate Detail Photo 
 Figure 13 - Primary Oxygen Regulator with Stepper Linear Actuator 
 Item 116 – EVA mode micro-switch 
This is a single micro-switch that is actually a component within the Item 115 but is tracked separately.  
The PRACA database indicates that 2 failures have been attributed to the Item 116 micro-switch. Both 
were assembly/production based issues addressed by changes to assembly procedures.  
 Item 200 – Secondary Oxygen Pack (as a separable assembly) 
As with the shearplate, the tankage is not considered in this section as it is covered elsewhere, rather the 
structure that enables the SOP to be a separable item due to its logistical limitations (cannot charge 6000 
psi on-orbit) is the topic being addressed herein. A review of the PRACA database indicates that 18 
failures have been attributed to the SOP (excluding Item 213, 215, 210 specific failures).   
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Summary 
It is impossible to state with certainty that the AEMU and its associated simplifications vs the EMU will lead to 
improved reliability as the new hardware such as the RCA, SWME, regulators, gerotor pumps are unproven 
operationally; a risk that the AES component level and system level development testing [16] is attempting to mitigate 
as the design moves towards a flight reference design.  That said, the removal of components with extensive failure 
histories, reduction in component count, deletion of the condensate loop, and associated reduction in the likelihood of 
free water in the ventilation loop all point in the right direction with the summation of failures for all of the removed 
components totaling 248 failures on the EMU Program.  Extensive testing and tools such as the Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will inform future decisions as the new AEMU 
components mature towards the flight application.  
C. Components that have been redesigned 
With the plan to upgrade or redesign hardware based on technological improvements that provide extended 
functionality or to mitigate undesirable failure mechanisms observed in the operational use of the product, there have 
been many components which are being redesigned. Table 2 provides the listing of the EMU components that have 
been redesigned in comparison to the AEMU application along with their designation cross-references.  The 
subsequent paragraphs provide a brief description of the function of the component in the EMU, similar or added 
functionality in the AEMU, the details of the failure history with the EMU operational use, as well as a brief description 
of the design changes being implemented for the AEMU. 
 
Shuttle/ISS 
EMU CEI Description 
AEMU 
Item Description 
100 Primary Life Support System (PLSS) Z-000 Portable Life Support System (PLSS) 
112 Primary Oxygen Supply Pressure PT-112 Primary Oxygen Vessel Pressure 
113D Primary Pressure Control Module, Suit Regulator PRV-113 Primary Oxygen Regulator 
114 Ventilation Loop Pressure DP-114 DP-214 Ventilation Loop Pressure 
121 Ventilation flow sensor and check valve 
DP-321 
FM-323C 
FM-324C 
Ventilation flow sensor  
Check Valve on Primary Fan Outlet 
Check Valve on Secondary Fan Outlet 
122 IRCO2 sensor GS-322 GS-300 Multi-gas sensor (CO2/H2O) 
123C Fan/Pump/Separator - Pump PMP-423 PMP-422 Thermal Loop Pump 
131/148/162 Feedwater tanks FSA-431 FSA-531 Feedwater Supply Assembly 
132B Feedwater supply pressure sensor, water side PT-432 Feedwater supply pressure (pump inlet) 
138 Feedwater pressure sensor (also used for airlock pressure) 
PT-116 
PT-1001 
Vacuum and ambient reference pressure 
transducers 
139 Sublimator temperature sensor TS-439 SWME outlet temperature 
140 Sublimator HX-440 HX-340 
Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator 
(SWME) 
Ventilation Loop Heat Exchanger 
146 Positive Pressure Relief Valve (PPRV) RV-346 RV-348 Positive Pressure Relief Valve (PPRV) 
150 Caution and Warning System 
CWS-650 
CON-150 
CON-250 
CON-350 
CON-450 
CON-550 
Caution and Warning System 
210 Secondary Oxygen Bottle PV-210 Secondary Oxygen Vessel 
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Shuttle/ISS 
EMU CEI Description 
AEMU 
Item Description 
300 Display and Control Module (DCM) DCU-685 Display and Control Unit (DCU) 
350 DCM electronics assembly DCU-685 Display and Control Unit (DCU) 
385 Oxygen and water manifold DCU-685 Display and Control Unit (DCU) 
311 Suit Pressure Gauge PG-311 Suit Pressure Gauge 
314 DCM Purge Valve HV-314 Multi-position Suit Purge Valve (MSPV) 
321 Thermal Control Valve (TCV) TCV-421 Thermal Control Valve (TCV) 
330 Multiple Connector QD-686 Common Multiple Connector 
480 Contamination Control Cartridge (CCC) TCC-360 Trace Contaminant Control  
490 Battery Assembly BATT-690 PLSS Primary Battery Assembly 
Table 2 - Component/Functions Redesigned 
Pressure Transducers (Item 112/114/132/138) 
All of the listed pressure transducers utilize either a bourdon tube (Item 112) or bellows (Items 114/132/138) connected 
to a potentiometer/wiper assembly.  This approach offers the lowest power solution while providing a 0-5 VDC output 
signal.  However, the technology is not well supported or widely used in industry and has several drawbacks due to 
the moving contact of the wiper on the potentiometer.  A review of the PRACA database revealed the following: 
Item 112 – 3 failures since 1979; none related to actual sensor performance (GSE test errors, installation problems) 
Item 114 – 12 failures including 4 in the last 5 years 
Item 132 – 17 failures nearly all due to improper output 
Item 138 – 7 failures; none in the last 12 years 
The design for the Item 114/132/138 is essentially the same with slightly different scaling and ambient referencing.    
The AEMU pressure transducer designs will utilize a more common media isolated strain gauge approach to reduce 
sensitivity to solder balls, FOD, and wear. For the AEMU DP-114/DP-214 wet-wet differential pressure transducer 
application in the ventilation loop, the sensor design will include the use of Fomblin Y06 fluorocarbon oil as the 
hydraulic fluid, much like what was done with the Item 112; in this way, should the stainless diaphragm rupture, a 
small amount of Fomblin (AIT of >427C in 100% O2 at 1500 psia, [17]) rather than silicone (silicone grease Oxygen 
Index = 26+/-1, [17]) will be introduced into the ventilation loop. 
 
Primary Pressure Control Module, Suit Regulator (Item 113D) 
The dual mode regulator (113D) enables remote setting of the regulator output to different set-points via the use of a 
dual spring approach on top of the Belleville spring.  Both springs are used to provide the EVA pressure of 4.2-4.4 
psid and one spring is pulled up with a clevis attachment to a sliding cam mechanism to provide the IVA pressure 0.4-
1.4 psid.  In order to meet the added functionality required for the AEMU, a two set-point design could not be used 
and the design evolved into a stepper actuated mechanical regulator with ~8000 possible set points that can be defined 
by the program using the suit.  These multiple set-points meet all of the same operational capabilities that the previous 
dual mode regulator could achieve but then offer the ability to perform in-suit Decompression Sickness (DCS) 
treatment, zero prebreathe protocols (and a number in between), and the ability to have the flexibility to mate with 
vehicles having differing pressure schedules such as suitport with a rover or other vehicle.  A review of the PRACA 
database with respect to the Item 113D in particular indicates that a total of 64 failures were attributed to the Item 113 
over the course of the program with 22 of them related to the Item 113D.  All but 4 of the 22 failures occurred before 
1985 in the early phase of the program.  However, the 113D dual mode regulator cannot be easily divorced from the 
115 shearplate assembly where the sliding cam actuator and micro-switches reside as they are critical to the 
implementation of the dual mode approach.  As mentioned previously, there were an additional 14 failures attributed 
to the actuator itself.  This would be expected to worsen if the suit were operated in a dusty environment such as the 
lunar surface.  This was another consideration in the decision to convert the actuation mechanism into a stepper linear 
actuator which could be electrically controlled and sealed to the environment. 
  
Ventilation flow sensor and check valve (Item 121) 
The Item 121 utilizes a flapper style check valve tied to sealed micro-switch assembly that is set to trip when the valve 
closes enough that the volumetric flowrate through the valve is below 3.7 acfm.  A review of the PRACA database 
indicates that 21 failures have been attributed to the Item 121.  As is shown in Figure 14, most of the early program 
failures centered on check valve performance with a stable period of performance into the mid-1990’s where failures 
of the micro-switch and sensor portion became more prevalent.   
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 Figure 14 - Item 121 Failure History 
For the AEMU, the original intention was to utilize an analog flow sensor such as flowmeter to enable the use of 
variable trip points in order to make the PLSS more easily adaptable between various spacesuit assemblies with 
varying ventilation flow requirements.  However, as a further simplification in the recent AEMU design work, the 
sensor has been removed and the flow sensing is now accomplished by measuring the pressure drop across the HX-
340 ventilation loop heat exchanger (a component that is already present for the purpose of controlling the helmet 
inlet gas temperature) with DP-321, a simple differential sensor that is similar in design to that of DP-114/DP-214.   
 
IRCO2 sensor (Item 122) 
The Item 122 uses an incandescent source and photo detector with filtering in the 4.3um wavelength range to detect 
and quantify the presence of CO2 in a flow through sense cell using a Beer-Lambert Law relation. The current sensor 
design has been in use since the early 1990s after it was the answer to the challenges that the electro-chem sensor 
posed: frequent calibrations and slow response times.  The sensor itself has been quite reliable and even with most of 
the fleet now in the ~20 year old range, these sensors are functioning with only calibration checks not calibrations 
(alter the senor output to align with a standard).  The problem for this sensor arises with the excessive moisture present 
in the EMU ventilation loop both from sublimator slurper carryover but also from high dew point gas entering the 
sense head which has an excellent view to space through the sublimator vent hole in the PLSS Impact Shield/TMG. 
Early issues with free water in the ventilation loop were dealt with via design changes such: implementation of the 
Zytex sleeve intended to tolerate direct free water exposure in the head and implementation of the Vent Flow Ring 
(VFR) which precludes the water released from the separator drum on shutdown from running down into the sensor 
head. For a Beer-Lambert sensor, the free water absorbs across a large range that encompasses the particular CO2 
absorption peak of choice resulting in a false high CO2 reading which the sensor is capable of detecting and latching 
the output at full scale (30 mmHg).  In the case of the Item 122, this sensor is responsible for a high number of in-
flight failures (Figure 15).   
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 Figure 15 - Item 122 CO2 Sensor Failure History 
This is undoubtedly due to multiple causes: 
 As experienced, the sensor failure is criticality 3 as flight rules allow for derating of the remaining time on 
LiOH or Metox and the use of the crew to detect their own hypercapnia symptoms, then the EVA is continued. 
Hence, there is less of a driver to correct this failure than one that forces EVA termination albeit that it is not 
trivial and results in a loss of system margin as there is no suit level detection of the scrubber health during 
the EVA. 
 There are no easy answers to provide a guaranteed fix to the problem, although there have been a few simple 
things that could be implemented with expectation of yielding no worse a result than the current failure rate 
[18]. 
o Place a thermal “sock” over the sense head to reduce the thermal IR lost through the view to space 
(Figure 16) from the exposed stainless steel sense head; this was recommended as a result of the 
STS-103 flight failure investigation. 
o Install a “pitot style” insert into the Item 122 pickup tube to raise its input to the gas stream centerline 
instead of the outer most wall pick-up which easily picks up free water from slurper carryover. 
 
 Figure 16 - IRCO2 Sensor Head View to Space 
For the AEMU, key technological advances like the RCA and SWME enable the removal of the sublimator slurper 
function and the use of gas that has a much lower dew point providing more margin in the ventilation loop to prevent 
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inadvertent formation of free water where it is not desirable.   In this environment, the Item 122 would work well and 
as a result, it is a backup plan to mitigate the risk of some of the newer technologies being pursued.  The primary plan 
for the AEMU gas sensor is the use of a Tunable Diode Laser (TDL) which enables the measurement of both CO2 
and H2O content to greater accuracy in the ventilation loop using a single instrument while offering a potentially 
lower power consumption as well.  The TDL also referred to as Wavelength Modulation Spectroscopy (WMS), is also 
a Beer-Lambert Law device that would not work well in the EMU but will work well in the lower dew point ventilation 
loop of the AEMU. 
 
F/P/S Water Pump (Item 123C) 
The EMU F/P/S water pump, as described earlier, is implemented via a centrifugal pump that rotates at 19.7krpm 
magnetically coupled the common motor shaft.  The F/P/S failure history was discussed as part of the earlier section 
covering the reuse of the centrifugal fan design.  Detailed review of the PRACA database with respect to the water 
pump, Item 123C, indicates that 33 failures of the 96 total have been attributed to the pump itself.  The desire to 
decouple the fluid loops, tolerate water contamination, save power, lower pump speed, enable self-priming, tolerate 
entrained gas, lower the cavitation pressure point, and add redundancy all drive the selections towards a positive 
displacement pump like the gerotor style presently used in the AEMU. 
 
Temperature Sensor (Item 139) 
The sublimator outlet temperature on the thermal loop, referred to as the Item 139, is implemented via a thermistor 
that is bonded in-place.  Review of the PRACA database indicates that, as one would expect, there are only 5 failures 
over the course of the program and they were either errors in configuration, production, or integration but not really 
of the sensor itself.  In one case, the sensor was located .75in from the outlet flow and was not effectively reading the 
fluid temperature so an engineering change (EC) was incorporated to locate the sensor closer to the flow.  For the 
AEMU, the current approach is to use 1k Ohm RTDs with immersion style integration as a mitigation towards that 
lesson learned.  The 1k RTD was chosen given its accuracy and linear response. 
 
Sublimator (Item 140) 
The sublimator is a complex counter flow condensing heat exchanger that uses a porous plate and vacuum reference 
to sublimate feedwater to vacuum in order to reject the heat.  The sublimator is an engineering marvel as there is only 
a slight difference between an effect unit and one that makes “snow cones” without effective use of feedwater.  Review 
of the PRACA database indicates that 35 failures have been attributed to the Item 140 with the most frequent failure 
being the contamination of the porous plates due to various compounds in the feedwater; this was attributed to 9 
failures.  The contamination of slurper holes and the hydrophilic coating was considered the cause for 4 failures.  The 
AEMU is planning to make a significant change due to technology advancement in this area.  To that end, the AEMU 
will be using the Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator (SWME) which uses a hydrophobic polypropylene to directly 
evaporate a portion of the thermal loop stream to reject heat.  The SWME has already been and continues to be tested 
to demonstrate its tolerance to contaminants in the water.  There were also a number of failures due to handling 
sensitivity of the sublimator both due to bending or altering dimensions of the soft aluminum flange during 
installation/removal but also due to the tight gap tolerance for the porous plate shimming.  These do not exactly fit the 
SWME application but consideration of handling requirements will be important in the packaging.  
 
Positive Pressure Relief Valve (Item 146) 
The PPRV is a relatively simple poppet style relief valve which has a very tight crack/reseat pressure of 4.7 psid with 
full open flow requirements satisfied by 5.5 psid.  The valve has had reliability issues throughout the course of the 
program which is reflected in the PRACA database as there are 52 failures attributed to the PPRV.  Of those failures, 
the valve has shown sensitivity to contamination as there were 16 failures attributed to contamination.  There were 
also three failures related to high cracking pressure attributed to stiction.  The PPRV has long been on the Limited 
Life Items List requiring yearly cycling to limit the risk of stiction.  There were also 5 failures attributed to chattering 
when operating at elevated ambient pressures.  For the AEMU, the PPRV has been redesigned to improve 
contamination tolerance, reduce the chance of stiction, and increase stability when operating at elevated ambient 
pressures.   
 
Caution and Warning System (Item 150) 
The CWS was redesigned in the early 2000s and renamed the Enhanced Caution and Warning System (ECWS).  The 
development was cleaner and the deployment was also cleaner than the original CWS development based on the 
number and type of failure generated (Figure 17).  In both cases, the Item 150 is implemented as a monitoring system 
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which monitors system analog and digital data, computes the system state, limiting consumables, and issues messages 
to the crew based on detected faults, limiting consumables, or suit configuration changes.  The recent failure history 
is not a driver for the change in the CWS as implemented in the AEMU, rather it is the change in technology available 
and the functional requirements being implemented.  One of the key lessons learned from the difference seen between 
the two developments is that the ECWS development included the source code for the system wrapped in a Windows 
desktop simulator that enabled the operations community to simulate and thoroughly debug the code before 
implementation.  This is something that needs to be repeated as part of the AEMU development as well. 
 Figure 17 - EMU Item 150 CWS Failure History 
The ECWS uses a UTRC 196 16-bit microprocessor while the AEMU CWS is planning to use a SPARC Leon 3 32-
bit microprocessor which has been developed and supported by ESA and has newer versions readily available with 
modern software development toolchains.  The AEMU CWS is being asked to do more computationally as there are 
a few more sensors present and more calculations to be performed.  That said, the approach between the two has many 
similarities including the use as a monitoring system not a control system.  The recent versions of the AEMU have 
pushed the control functionality back into directly commanded controls from the crew via the Display and Control 
Unit (DCU) to FPGA-based controllers that are modular and lower level.  Since the AEMU uses more electro-
mechanical actuators, the control functionality has been pushed into low level, simple, modular controllers that possess 
a serial link via LVDS back to the CWS with control lines from the DCU [19]. 
 
Display and Control Module (Item 300/350/385) 
The DCM began as a single unit (referred to as the 1000 series for the serial numbers) and, due to manufacturing 
issues, was later split into two halves, an electrical half referred to as the Item 350, DCM Electronics Assembly and a 
pneumo-hydraulic half referred to as the Item 385, DCM Oxygen and Water Manifold Assembly.  The new assembly 
has also been referred to as the 2000 series DCM. A review of the PRACA database indicates that the DCM, due to 
its complexity and significant crew/vehicle interfaces, has had the most in-flight failures of any other component 
(Figure 18).  The combination of the Item 300, Item 350, and Item 385 has 132 failures attributed to the combination; 
this does not account for the details that are tracked separately such as the potentiometers, etc.  
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 Figure 18 - Item 300/350/385 Failure History 
Takeaways relevant to the AEMU design include: 
 Thermal loop pressure drop 
o Prior to the design of the 2000 series DCM, there were multiple failures related to the pressure drop 
of the thermal loop lines. This was largely mitigated in the redesign.  Pressure drop in the thermal 
loop will be sensitive from a power point of view in the AEMU but not as sensitive as the EMU due 
to the very limited head rise available from the small centrifugal pump. 
 Micro-switches 
o There were several failures due to micro-switches failing to read the O2 actuator position.  The 
micro-switch assembly was combined with the shearplate in a modular fashion as part of the ORU 
EMU conversion in 1997.  The complexities and issues related to the micro-switches are discussed 
in the Item 115, shearplate section. 
 Power reset circuit 
o The simplicity of the Power Mode Switch (PMS) does not permit a mate before break on the power 
transfer resulting in a potential brown out condition during power transfer.  This is addressed by the 
use of reset circuits on the affected controllers in the Item 350, DCM Electronics assembly and the 
Item 150, CWS.  However, the reset circuit in the CWS was redesigned to correct the problem in 
the ECWS.  The DCM reset circuit has not been redesigned to correct the issue, so it continues to 
manifest itself as an occasional DCM display lockup during power transfer.  The AEMU will use a 
low power diode OR approach to enable a mate before break on the power transfer between vehicle 
and battery power. 
 
Thermal Control Valve (Item 321) 
The TCV as implemented on EMU, is a spool type mixing valve that the crew directly operates with gloved hands 
and limited access to set the effective water temperature and in limited cases flowrate fed to the LCVG for metabolic 
heat removal.  A review of the PRACA database indicates that there have been 10 failures over the course of the 
program that have been attributed to the Item 321.  A total of 8 of the 10 failures noted were due to excessive torque 
for valve operation.  For the AEMU, the valve function has been changed to that of a diverter valve which alters the 
mass flow rate to alter the removed heat, still supporting LCVG bypass functionality required for colder environments.  
The operation of the valve is performed remotely by the thermal loop controller (CON-450) driving the linear stepper 
actuator to position the valve back in the PLSS.  This approach has the following benefits over the directly actuated 
Item 321: 
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 Crew interface with gloved hands can be adjusted to avoid challenging the capabilities of reach and applied 
force of gloved hands 
 The exact valve position will be known by virtue of the stepper actuator with the added benefit of a linear 
potentiometer as a redundant position reading 
 Future capabilities such as Auto-Cooling Control (ACC) may be used as the valve directly supports it 
 Simplification of the thermal loop by conversion to a diverter valve approach 
 
Battery (Item 490) 
The battery has undergone significant change over the course of the program.  The original battery used on the program 
was a single string of 11series Ag-Zn cells forming a battery rated for just over the required 26.6Ah and referred to as 
the 1000 series battery.  It was later upgraded to another battery composed of a single string of 11series Ag-Zn cells 
offering a capacity increase with >32Ah nominally and the promise of a longer wet-life/higher cycle-life referred to 
as the “Increased Capacity Battery” or ICB or 2000 series battery.  The first two changed suppliers but the technology 
was evolutionary.  The significant change occurred when the Lithium Ion Battery (LIB) a single string of 5 series 
prismatic Li-Ion cells was chosen as the next EMU battery.  The LIB encountered a number of challenges and could 
not be realized as a flight product.  It was completely redesigned and named the Long Life Battery (LLB).  The LLB 
used carefully screened high volume COTS cylindrical 18650 cells arranged in a 5 series of 16 parallel cells.   
 Figure 19 - Item 490 Failure History 
A review of the PRACA database indicates that there have been 104 failures attributed to the Item 490 battery over 
the course of the program (Figure 19).  Of those listed failures, the basic break-out of the largest contributors is 
included in Table 3. 
 
High Level Grouping Number of Failures Percentage of Total (%) 
Case/cell leakages of custom prismatic cells 15 14.4 
Formation procedure failures 6 5.7 
RV leakage or other RV failure 18 17.3 
Internal shorts (electrolyte bridging, etc) 11 10.5 
Manufacturing errors (potting, over-torque, etc) 27 26.0 
Testing errors  8 7.7 
Usage/handling operational procedures 5 4.8 
   Table 3 - Item 490 Failure Contributor Break-out  
As can be seen in Figure 19, there were a number of failures with the 1000 series Ag-Zn battery, many of which were 
manufacturing issues and case/cell leakage failures associated with the custom prismatic cells in the battery.  The RV 
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leakage and other RV failures were spread across both of the Ag-Zn battery designs along with the internal shorts 
from electrolyte bridging.  The number of testing/handling errors over the life of the program is not surprising with 
the extent of manual testing that existed in the 1980’s.  While the concerns over the addition of the catastrophic thermal 
runaway and fire failure mode that the Li-Ion presents requires additional work, one should also note that many of the 
failure causes present on the custom prismatic Ag-Zn cells are much less likely to be present in cylindrical mass 
produced and screened cells for the following reasons: 
 Low volume custom prismatic cell production does not really enable NASA to refine the cell production 
process while companies like Panasonic, Molicel, Boston Power, and others makes thousands if not millions 
of the batteries that can be cherry-picked taking advantage of the investment in those companies have made 
in their processes. 
 The cells are “formed” at the time of manufacture so there is no need for battery formation procedures where 
the improper amount of electrolyte can be added, or other critical steps can be omitted or improperly 
executed; rather companies with highly automated processes can make these cells over and over more 
successfully. 
 The cells already include their own Current Interrupt Devices (CID) and relief valve integrated into the cells 
meaning that the overhead of tracking, storing, and performing crack/reseat/leakage for all 11 RVs that below 
to a single Ag-Zn battery is no longer required. 
 The mass produced cells are observed, bought in lots, screened including NDE and destructive evaluation of 
samples reducing the opportunity for the frequency of internal shorts seen with the venting of KOH into the 
wicking and the migration associated with some of the Ag-Zn batteries.  
In the end, the difficult part of the battery fabrication is left to the companies that do it a lot and are efficient and 
effective.  This can be observed by examining the plot of the failure history (Figure 19) noting that the failure rates 
have dropped considering the implementation of a new battery, LLB into the fleet.  There have been 11 failures since 
2010 with 5 of them attributed to the ICB Ag-Zn battery and only 6 of them attributed to the new LLB in its initial 
implementation; of those 6 failures, infant mortality manufacturing issues have been the causes as would be anticipated 
in a new product.  This validates the current battery development plan for AEMU which is to fabricate modular 
distributed battery packs using Li-Ion 18650 cells carefully screened from major manufacturers. 
 
One of the most significant takeaways from the LLB experience is one that has, fortunately not manifested as an actual 
failure on the EMU Program, but is a lesson learned from the Boeing 787 Li-Ion battery failures [20] and has been 
applied to several NASA Li-Ion batteries with the assistance of the NESC.  Recent testing of the LLB for thermal 
runaway propagation which could occur with an internal short in one of the 18650 cells revealed that the current 
battery design did not limit or control the propagation as several cells within the test battery ignited.  The purpose here 
is not to try to give third party anecdotal information about the LLB testing prior to the publishing of a formal test 
report by those responsible in EP/JSC as much as it is to relay that these lessons learned are being applied concurrently 
to the AEMU battery design. The same organization testing the current batteries is consulting on the design of the 
AEMU battery to first provide controls for a single cell thermal runaway without propagation followed by further 
design and debate over the extent of the Battery Management System (BMS) needed within the battery design. 
 
Suit Pressure Gauge (Item 311)/Suit Purge Valve (Item 314)/Multiple Connector (Item 330) 
The Item 311 suit pressure gauge included as part of the Item 385 oxygen water manifold is implemented via a simple 
and classic bourdon tube design.  A review of the PRACA database indicates that 21 failures have been attributed to 
the Item 311 suit pressure gauge.  Of the listed failures, 7 failures were attributed to condensation formation from the 
moist ventilation loop gas followed by subsequent water column offset readings and/or corrosion.  The pressure gauge 
port is connected directly to the suit volume through a small orifice feed-through from the DCM to HUT interface 
pad.  The gauge location for the AEMU is presently anticipated to be on the arm of the Z-suit but assessments are still 
pending as to whether or not there will be sufficient room on the anterior of the HUT to add the pressure gauge to the 
DCU.  If this is added to the DCU, the protection of the gauge from condensation will be an input into the design of 
the interface. The second largest contributor to the 21 failures was manufacturing/quality control issues with the 
chosen supplier; this will be investigated further during the initial gauge prototyping phase of the gauge. 
 
The Item 314 Suit Purge Valve is a simple orificed slide-action valve that has been quite reliable over the course of 
the EMU Program; it is used at the start of every EVA.  A review of the PRACA database indicates that only 4 failures 
have been attributed to the Item 314 and 3 of them prior to the valve redesign that was implemented in 1982.  For the 
AEMU, this would be a good starting point with exception of the need for a multi-position suit purge valve (MSPV) 
and the need for dust tolerance.  
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Item 330 DCM Multiple Connector is a custom pneumo-hydraulic and electrical connector which connects the high 
pressure oxygen supply, thermal loop inlet/outlet, feedwater recharge, and power/comm from the vehicle supplies.  A 
review of the PRACA database indicates that 23 failures have been attributed to the Item 330 multiple connector.  
Twelve of the 23 failures occurred before 1985 during the initial development and implementation.  For the remaining 
failures that occurred after that time, there were 5 flight failures occurring after 1991; 4 of them were related to the 
DB25 electrical connector (1 for a bent pin, 1 for high impedance improper engagement, 2 for damaged environmental 
o-ring).  The bent pin failure occurred on the STS-103 Hubble servicing mission.  The result of the failure was the 
inability to power the suit on umbilical meaning that the crew had to use battery margin to perform the IVA activities; 
something quite undesirable for long complex EVAs like those of a Hubble mission.  The other flight failure occurred 
on STS-96 when the lubricant washed out of the thermal loop water poppets which were located on one side of the 
multiple connector; this increased the actuation force to engage the poppets generating a torque about the centerline 
cam and causing the multiple connector to bind.  This particular failure was critical as it took ~30 min for the crew to 
mate the SCU to the DCM to get vehicle services.   The corrective action from this failure was to add a four year 
limited life to the multiple connector in which every four years, it would be torn down, cleaned, and reassembled with 
lubricant.  This had the effect of putting more Krytox 240AC or Braycote 601 fluorinated grease (thickened with fine 
PTFE particulate) into the water loop where it would show up in later years clogging filters.  While the AEMU will 
require a new multiple connector design due to the changes in the required vehicle services, these failures and lessons 
learned are critical to designing an improved multiple connector.  The AEMU multiple connector will need to tolerate 
differential forces from each of the services if poppets are used.  There were two leakage failures due to contamination 
of the poppet seals along with an excessive pressure drop in the thermal loop as a result of a clogged/contaminated 
filter.  The fluid ports need to tolerate contamination if possible and the filtration needs to be serviceable.  For the 
listed failures associated with the electrical connector, the use of a scoop proof, blind mate connector will reduce the 
chances of having a bent pin and the blind mate features coupled with proper tolerancing should reduce the chance of 
improper engagement.  The use of an o-ring around the connector can be mitigated by using alternate means to isolate 
the electrical connector from the fluids ports.   
Other lessons learned 
Aside from the individual lessons learned from the individual components, the sub-assemblies, and assemblies, 
there are considerable lessons to be learned from system level operational failures and successes.  Overall, the ORU 
EMU Program has been successful in that it made possible the disassembly/reassembly of major assemblies of the 
ISS EMU such as the DCM, HUT, PLSS, and SOP.  Key features employed were captive fasteners with hex-drive 
screws, face-seals, and novel integrated minimum torque checks from Belleville washers and slide locks that won’t 
engage without proper compression of the washers.  The use of common tools was also a focus albeit that a separate 
ORU toolkit was developed to house the needed tools and the assembly/disassembly aids in order to save crew time.  
All of these features have worked well and are being carried over in the AEMU.  The only problem with the ORU 
EMU approach is that it wasn’t implemented to a lower level because the ground rules at the time of the project did 
not assume the duration of operation that ISS would later require.  Lessons learned from the Loss of Cooling on-orbit 
failure troubleshooting and others since have demonstrated that component level ORU-ability is a necessity.   This is 
one of the primary drivers in the packaging of the AEMU and its use of a motherboard style backplate with each 
component independently accessible as an ORU item on the backplate secured with captive fasteners, sealed 
predominantly with face seals, and electrical connectors which include triple start Acme threads and scoop proof 
designs.  From the Shuttle Program usage model for which the EMU was initially designed, everything was basically 
a maintenance item fully serviced on the ground during a full tear-down PIA that occurred between flights.  As that 
usage model evolved to the 6 years and 25 EVA model that the ISS EMU is using today, there were limitations as to 
what could be done short of significant redesign of the EMU.  Hence, the finest filter set in the PLSS (Item 141 and 
Item 127) both are accessed for replacement but require removal of the PLSS TMG and Impact shield to achieve that 
access.  The feedwater bladders (Items 131/148/162) are highly integrated to the machined watertank structure such 
that it would be impractical (although not impossible) to change them on-orbit.  The Item 490 battery and Item 480 
CCC (LiOH or Metox) are routinely accessed each EVA to change out consumables.  The access is made simple by a 
dual zipper access of a rear flap on the PLSS TMG and some simple to actuate latches to secure/release them.  
Considering these areas of improvement as well as successes, the AEMU implements access to all anticipated nominal 
maintenance items without removing the PLSS TMG or accessing the PLSS at all, rather they are immediately 
available in the hatch the crew uses to don/doff the suit.  The items that the AEMU includes as readily available within 
the hatch include (Figure 20): 
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F-448 – Thermal Loop Filter  
FSA-431 – Primary Feedwater Supply Assembly  
FSA-531 – Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Assembly 
TCC-360 – Trace Contaminant Control 
 Figure 20 - AEMU Rear Entry Hatch Maintenance Item Access 
The modular battery cartridges which are intended to be charged in-situ via umbilical connection from the vehicle 
charger are also readily accessible by opening the PLSS TMG access flaps around the hatch area.  Although there is 
no intention to need to replace the battery in the PLSS within 100 EVAs, should that need arise due to malfunction, 
changing the battery will be reasonable. 
Summary 
As has been discussed throughout the entirety of this paper, the Shuttle/ISS EMU Program has offered an extensive 
and well documented operational history from which many lessons can be learned and applied to the next suit design. 
Even for those components or technologies that have been operationally reliable in the EMU and hence are similar 
between the EMU and AEMU designs, there are lessons to be learned for why certain choices were made in that may 
have affected that success.  In the study of the components/technologies that have been removed between the EMU 
and the AEMU designs, some might ask why bother? But once again, even this case, there are significant lessons that 
can be learned and at minimum an appreciation can be garnered for the relative increases in complexity locally (such 
as the RCA) which enable the simplification of the system as a whole and the associated operational failure history of 
the components no longer present.  For the components/functions that are common from the EMU to the AEMU, but 
the design approaches and technology are different, some of the most significant lessons can be assessed and 
considered in the AEMU design.  A phrase that has made its way around the internet and popular culture for a number 
of years is  [21]  “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” While there is no guarantee that 
the successes of the past will be recreated or that failures of the past will be ameliorated, the study of this history 
provides insight that would otherwise be unknown until the failures were repeated in ignorance.  To that end, this 
paper has given key takeaways and planned actions to demonstrate that the base design approach to the AEMU PLSS 
packaging, the system level design, the design of every component in the AEMU, and the outline processes are rooted 
in the knowledge obtained from the review of the failures and successes of the suit system that has successfully served 
Shuttle and assembled the International Space Station over the past 35+ years.   
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